How Can the ECB be Credible? by BINI SMAGHI, Lorenzo
a cu
EUI Working Paper RSC No. 96/24


























































































































































































EUI Working Paper RSC No. 96/24  
Bini Smaghi: How Cari thè ECB be Credible?
WP




























































































The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the H igh Council o f the EUI in 
1993 to cany out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas o f  
European integration and public policy in Europe. W hile developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in d o se  relation with the four departments 




























































































E U R O P E A N  U N IV E R S IT Y  IN S T IT U T E , F L O R E N C E  
R O B E R T  S C H U M A N  C E N T R E
How Can the ECB be Credible?
LORENZO BINI SMAGHI
European Monetary Institute
E U I W ork in g  P aper R S C  N o . 9 6 /2 4  



























































































A ll rights reserved .
N o  part o f  th is paper m ay b e reproduced  in  any form  
w ith ou t p erm ission  o f  the author.
©  L oren zo  B in i S m agh i 
Printed in  Ita ly  in  M ay 1996  
E uropean U n iversity  In stitu te 
B ad ia  F ieso la n a  





























































































Programme in Economie Policy
The Working Papers series
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Central bank credibility is essential for the achievement of monetary 
stability. This widely accepted principle is based on two axioms, shared by the 
main stream post-“rational expectations” macroeconomics literature: first, 
monetary stability, in particular price stability, is ultimately the result of 
monetary policy; second, credibility is a crucial factor for the effectiveness of 
policy: a lack of credibility is an obstacle to welfare-maximising policies.
The paper aims at examining the issue of how the ECB, which will be in 
charge of conducting the single monetary policy of the European Monetary 
Union, can be credible. Credibility can be assessed in terms of the probability 
that market participants attribute to the achievement of the objective explicitly 
pursued. Credibility has a dynamic dimension, as this probability may vary over 
time, depending in particular on effective performance. The ECB’s credibility 
can be expected to evolve, in line with the results achieved in terms of price 
stability. However, at the start of Stage Three of EMU, the ECB will have no 
track record. This makes the issue of ECB’s credibility no less interesting.
Indeed, even before the start of Stage Three of EMU market participants 
try to anticipate to what extent the transfer of monetary sovereignty to the ECB 
will entail a change in the monetary policy stance, at least compared to that of 
the Bundesbank, and eventually lead to adjust long-term inflationary 
expectations. Fears that the ECB may not be as tough as the Bundesbank in 
fighting inflation has been quoted as one factor underlying capital flight towards 
the Swiss franc and the increase in German yields in the second half of 1995.
The paper aims at analysing the factors that may affect the credibility of 
the ECB at the start of its life, i.e. its “genetic” credibility. The paper does not 
adopt a theoretical approach. It rather aims at examining some factors, few 
mentioned in the literature, others in public debate, that may be expected to 
affect the credibility of the ECB at the start of Stage Three.
The paper examines three broad factors that may influence central bank 
credibility. The first keeps with the recent literature on policy delegation and 
optimal policy contracts, focusing on central bank independence. Section 1 
examines, on the basis of the prevailing criteria used in the literature, the degree
' This paper has been prepared for the Conference “What monetary policy for the 
European Central Bank?”, held in Frankfurt on 9-10 June 1995. The author is the only 




























































































of central bank independence that the ECB can be expected to enjoy. However, 
inflation performance and central bank credibility do not depend only on central 
bank independence. Other factors play an important role. They regard in 
particular the environment in which the central bank operates. Section 2 
examines some environmental factors which are likely to influence ECB’s 
behaviour at the start of Stage Three and which may have a bearing on its 
credibility. These factors relate in particular to the economic conditions 
prevailing at the start of Stage Three, in particular concerning the degree of 
convergence of member countries, financial markets’ development in the period 
preceding Stage Three, and political considerations, affecting inter alia the 
acceptability of EMU and the process underlying the selection of participating 
countries. The third factor likely to influence credibility, examined in Section 
3, is the monetary policy framework of the ESCB. In absence of a track record, 
market participants will assess the likely performance of the ECB on the basis 
of their judgement on the effectiveness of the monetary policy framework 
chosen by the ECB and its capacity to conduct a single monetary policy aimed 
at achieving price stability.
1. The independence of the ECB
An important body of literature has examined the issue of how 
institutional arrangements for central banks can solve the problem of time 
inconsistency faced by political authorities in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Time inconsistency arises from the fact that the effectiveness of monetary policy 
depends on agents’ expectations about such policy. With respect to nominal 
variables, such as inflation, monetary policy is most effective when agents 
perfectly anticipate policy actions. On the contrary, with respect to real 
economic variables, such as output or employment, monetary policy is most 
effective when it is not anticipated. However, the latter effectiveness is short 
lived and may lead to a longer term loss of effectiveness as agents tend to 
anticipate that monetary policy may diverge from their expectations.
One way of resolving the dilemma is to achieve long term effectiveness 
with respect to nominal variables by prohibiting the central bank from pursuing 
short term objectives in terms of real economic variables. The conduct of 
monetary policy would be directed only at nominal variables and separated from 
that of other economic policies. The central bank would be entrusted with a 
sufficient degree of independence to pursue primarily the objective of price 
stability. Incentive compatible contractual arrangements would solve the 




























































































independence of action and accountability of results.2 Central bank 
independence is therefore seen as an important element of a time-consistent 
policy framework.
This section examines the extent to which the ECB can be expected to be 
independent. The analysis can clearly be only conjectural, since the ECB will 
come into life just few months before the start of Stage Three. However, there 
are already some elements for an assessment on how independent the ECB can 
be expected to be.
1. Measuring the independence of the ECB
In recent years a growing literature has tried to analyse the degree of 
central bank independence (CBI) on the basis of quantitative indicators. 
Measures of CBI have generally been based on a set of objective criteria, 
referring to the legal and economic status of the central bank.
One of the broadest analyses on this subject was conducted by Cukierman 
(1992). On the basis of sixteen criteria defining four main areas of CBI 
(appointment of the Board, policy formulation, policy objectives and financing 
of the government), an index of legal central bank independence is established 
and then applied to several industrial countries and LDCs. The Deutsche 
Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank emerge as the two central banks with 
the highest degree of legal independence, followed, among others, by the Federal 
Reserve. This ranking is similar to that of other measures presented in the 
literature.3
Cukierman (1992) runs regressions aimed at relating inflation performance 
to the degree of central bank independence. For industrial countries, legal central 
bank independence is found to have a negative effect on average inflation over 
the period 1950-89. These results are in line with those obtained in other 
research in this field, although the degree of significance of the relationship 
between CBI and inflation tends to vary widely.4
2 See Tabellini and Persson (1994).
3 See, among others, Bade and Parking (1980), Atesina (1988), Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini (1991).
4 See Alesina (1988), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Eijffmger and Schaling 




























































































The methodology followed by Cukierman can be implemented as a first 
step for analysing the independence of the ECB. The basis of the ranking system 
for the sixteen criteria used by Cukierman is provided in the annex. Table 1 
reports, in the first three columns, Cukierman’s results for the Bundesbank, the 
Swiss National Bank and the Federal Reserve. The results for the ECB, obtained 
on the basis of the Statutes annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, are reported in the 
fourth column.
The results show that the ECB has the highest score in terms of legal 
independence, higher than those of the other three central banks considered by 
Cukierman to be among the most independent. The ECB has a higher score for 
the formulation of monetary policy, given the protection from interference 
granted by its Statute and the prohibition on monetary financing of the 
government inserted in the Treaty. It has a lower score than the Bundesbank, 
however, for the shorter average term of office of the ESCB Governing 
Council.5 The ECB and the Bundesbank are granted an equal degree of legal 
independence with respect to the objective of price stability and the powers to 
resolve potential conflicts with political authorities on monetary policy matters.
The straightforward application of Cukierman’s objective criteria suggests 
that the ECB should be among the most, if not the most, independent of central 
banks.6 Extending Cukierman’s empirical results on the relationship between 
central bank independence and inflation performance, one would expect, ceteris 
paribus, that the inflation performance of the ECB would be as good if not 
better than that of the Bundesbank or the Swiss National Bank.7
2. The limits of measurement
In spite of the numerous attempts that have been made to measure CBI, 
the latter can hardly be assessed only on the basis of objective criteria. First, it 
is difficult to define a complete list of criteria that can provide a precise picture
5 The term of office of the members of the Executive Board is eight years, as for the 
Bundesbank, but that of the other members of the ECB Governing Council depends 
on national legislation, with a minimum of five years, as against eight years in the 
Bundesbank.
6 This is in line with the analysis of Alesina and Grilli (1992) using another indicator 
of CBI.





























































































of the legal status of a central bank. Even with a wide list, such as that 
suggested by Cukierman, important elements may be omitted. One example 
concerns the economic independence of a central bank, without which the scope 
of its activities in the conduct of monetary policy operations may be seriously 
limited. Rules concerning the use of collateral and the procedure for allocating 
profits and losses may have an impact on the room for manoeuvre available to 
the central bank. These aspects are practically ignored in the literature. Another 
important element affecting central bank independence which is often ignored 
is the participation in the decisions concerning the exchange rate regime and 
policy. This issue will be examined below. It is obvious that in a small country 
a legally independent central bank can have little control over monetary policy 
if it does not participate actively in the definition of the exchange rate policy.8
A further difficulty concerns the application of objective criteria to 
interpret legal provisions. The ranking used in the Cukierman system can be 
disputed on several grounds. As an example, in the case of the Bundesbank the 
ranking used by Cukierman for policy formulation suggests that the German 
central bank participates in the formulation of monetary policy, but has little 
influence over it; on the other hand, the bank is considered to have the final 
word in the resolution of conflicts with the Government, at least on issues 
defined by law as being directly related to its objectives. A close reading of the 
Bundesbank Statutes and the historical experience of Germany’s monetary policy 
could suggest a slightly different interpretation. With respect to the formulation 
of monetary policy, the Bundesbank has always had a high degree of autonomy. 
Its Statute clearly assigns to it the task of defining Germany’s monetary policy 
with the aim of safeguarding the currency. On this criterion, the Bundesbank 
could therefore be given a higher score. On the other hand, concerning the 
resolution of conflicts with the Government on issues of common interest, the 
Bundesbank Act does not clearly specify who has the last word. However, the 
Government has the right to suspend a decision of the Bundesbank Council for 
two weeks, although this has never happened. Furthermore, for exchange rate 
policy issues, the Government has the final word, as experience has shown. On 
this latter criterion, therefore, a strict interpretation of the Statutes would suggest 
that a lower ranking than Cuckierman’s should be given to the Bundesbank.
An additional problem with the elaboration of a CBI index is the 
interpretation to be given to certain criteria. For instance, a low marking is given 
by Cukierman to a central bank whose executive Board is nominated by the 
executive branch of the government rather than through a more complex




























































































procedure involving other public bodies. This ranking is based on the 
assumption that the former procedure may lead to the appointment of persons 
who are more favourably inclined towards the government than the latter 
procedure. This assumption is not necessarily correct. If CBI is considered as 
desirable by society, a government nominating a member who is not fit for the 
job may be held objectively responsible by citizens and therefore be penalised. 
If the procedure is too complex, there may be no clear responsibility for the 
nomination of a person who proves to be unfit or not sufficiently independent. 
Another example is the low rating of CBI which is given by Cukierman to a 
central bank which does not participate in the government’s budgetary process. 
The opposite view could be held, according to which, to preserve its 
independence, the central bank should rather abstain from participating in the 
budgetary process so that it can more freely express a public judgement on it 
and retain autonomous margins of manoeuvre for its monetary policy.
Overall, it proves to be rather difficult to assess independence only on the 
basis of legal texts, not taking into account the country-specific experience and 
environment. Historical experience and customary developments can have as 
much if not more influence than formal law in defining the boundaries of central 
bank action. A central bank may de facto be more independent than it appears 
to be from legal texts, because its publicly recognised status has given it 
independence that goes beyond the formally established limits. Taking again the 
Bundesbank as an example, its Statutes contain little limitations with respect to 
the lending to the Government and does not prohibit interventions in the primary 
market for government securities, thereby suggesting a low degree of 
independence with respect to the monetary financing of the Government. Indeed, 
on this criterion, the Bundesbank is given a relatively low marking in 
Cukierman’s index (Table 1). However, experience shows that, although there 
is no explicit prohibition in the Bundesbank Act on lending to the Government, 
monetary financing has historically remained very low. The Bundesbank Act was 
revised in 1993, in particular concerning Chapter 20 of the Act, following the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and monetary financing has been formally 
forbidden. On the basis of Cukierman’s classification, this revision should lead 
to an increase in the index of CBI of nearly 30%. However, it can hardly be 
thought that the independence of the Bundesbank has changed significantly as 
a consequence of the new law.
In summary, the independence of a central bank cannot be assessed 




























































































the political economy of a country.9 Applying the legal status of one central 
bank to that of another country does not necessarily make the latter as 
independent as the former. In practice, central bank independence tends to 
establish itself through a sequence of specific events, some eventually entailing 
conflicts with other organs of government. The way these conflicts are resolved 
marks the boundaries of central bank independence and defines the limits of the 
central bank’s future scope for action. Such scope for action cannot be fully- 
separated from that of the other branches of government policy, because central 
bank’s actions inevitably impact on the overall equilibrium of the economy. 
Central banks know that although there may be no long-run trade-off between 
growth and inflation, there is a short-term relationship.
Conflict or potential conflict with other government bodies is intrinsic in 
central bank activity even in the case in which the central bank has the primary 
objective of pursuing price stability. This is because price stability cannot be 
achieved at each and every point in time. This is an aspect often ignored in the 
literature on CBI, which starts from Barro-Gordon’s simplifying assumption that 
the central bank has full control over the inflation rate at each point in time. If 
this assumption is removed, especially for the short term, some margins of 
discretion emerge in central banks’ action, which thus creates scope for conflict. 
This implies, in particular, that in modulating the intensity of its policy action, 
for instance after a shock which has brought the economy away from price 
stability, the central bank may have to take into account the impact of its action 
on the whole economy.
The way the conflict is resolved, or is expected to be resolved, defines the 
limits of the independence of a central bank. This is often associated in the 
literature to the concept of accountability of a central bank. Accountability is the 
way in which a central bank justifies its action, in view of the objective that it 
is assigned. This presumes that objectives can be specified in a contractual way 
so as to enable a clear-cut and adequate assessment of central bank performance. 
This, however, is not the case, precisely because the rate of inflation does not 
depend only on monetary policy. There is not a one-to-one instantaneous and 
deterministic relationship between central bank action and the rate of inflation. 
The latter is, in the short run, affected by several other stochastic factors in the 
economy. Maintaining price stability at each and every point in time is not 
realistic. Price stability is an objective to achieve over a certain period of time. 
Escape clauses have therefore to be established for possible short-term deviations 
that are not directly caused by monetary policy actions and that cannot be




























































































instantaneously remedied, simply because monetary policy takes time to impact 
on the price level. The problem thus arises of who has the responsibility of 
assessing the case for escape clauses. If the assessment is made by the political 
authorities, the problem of time inconsistency remains unsolved and 
accountability and central bank independence are of little use.10 Indeed, the 
authorities may have little incentive to put a central bank under pressure if the 
inflation rate has overshot the objective, as they may have themselves obtained 
advantages from such overshooting.
Ideally, the performance of the central bank should be assessed by those 
that, over time, benefit from price stability. This can only be society at large. 
This is obviously a vague concept for the practical implementation of 
accountability. In Germany, where the way in which the resolution of conflicts 
between the Bundesbank and the other branches of government is not formally 
defined, the support given by the citizens to the Bundesbank is considered to be 
the basis of central bank independence and accountability. Indeed, the 
withdrawal of public support from political authorities that have in the past 
publicly challenged the Bundesbank on monetary matters has probably 
contributed more to the latter’s independence than most articles of its Act. This 
is not to minimise the importance of the legal statutes, but just suggests that they 
cannot be the only basis for assessing independence.
Concerning the ECB, it is difficult at this stage to attempt making an 
assessment based on anything else than the legal texts since there is yet no 
experience. However, some elaboration of the simple quantitative criteria is 
required. This is the aim of the next section.
3. Strength and weaknesses of the ECB’s independence
This section examines the main features of the ECB Statute with the aim 
of assessing the potential for its independence. Four main areas of independence 
will be examined: i) statutory; ii) functional, iii) economic, iv) personal.
3.1. Statutory independence
The constitutional status of the ECB is recognised to be one of the points 
of strength of the ECB’s independence. It is the only central bank whose Statute 
is enshrined in a constitutional text and whose basic founding principles, in 
particular the concept of independence and the primary objective to “maintain




























































































price stability”, have a constitutional value. Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty has the 
same legal ranking as that of a constitution. Its adoption by the Member States 
of the European Union has, in some countries, implied a modification of the 
constitution. A modification of the Statute requires a new Treaty between the 
Member States, which has to be agreed and ratified by each of them.11
The explicit mentioning of price stability as the main objective of the ECB 
- rather than a generic reference to monetary stability or the safeguarding of the 
currency, which may be interpreted in the same way but, as will be suggested 
below, is not necessarily the case - further safeguards the ECB in the event of 
conflict with other organs of government. Indeed, the concept of monetary 
stability or of safeguarding the value of the currency which are mentioned in 
most other central bank statutes can be extended to incorporate other 
objectives.12 If money is defined in broad terms, embracing forms of financial 
wealth, the stability of its value is not necessarily in all cases associated with the 
stability of the price level. Under certain conditions, the objective of achieving 
price stability may temporarily come into conflict with the overall stability of 
monetary and financial wealth of the economy. For instance, a restrictive 
monetary policy aimed at achieving price stability can be associated with a 
temporary reduction in the value of financial assets and substantial turmoil in the 
financial system. These latter factors, which can certainly not be ignored, can 
however lead under normal circumstances to attenuate the degree of strictness 
of monetary policy required to achieve price stability.
Even a narrower concept of monetary stability referring to the stability of 
the value of central bank money is not necessarily consistent with price stability. 
Indeed, the value of money can be defined in at least three ways. The first is the 
internal value, or the purchasing power of money measured in terms of the 
general level of prices. Under this concept monetary stability and price stability 
do coincide. The second definition of monetary stability refers to the external 
value of the currency, expressed in terms of the exchange rate. Under this 
definition monetary stability and price stability do not necessarily coincide, 
especially in the short and medium term where exchange rate developments can 
depart from relative inflation performance. Such ambiguity was one of the
11 For a restricted number of articles that do not concern the main tasks and functions 
of the ECB or the principle of independence, a more flexible procedure is possible, 
requiring a qualified majority of the Council when the proposal is made by the ECB 
itself (subject to unanimity of the Governing Council of the ECB) or unanimity when 
the proposal is made by the Commission (see Article 41 of the Statute).




























































































elements at the origin of the conflict between the Bundesbank and the Federal 
Government in the late 1960s over the appropriate parity of the Deutsche Mark 
vis-à-vis the dollar in the Bretton Woods system. The final decision to revalue 
the Deutsche Mark, long requested by the Bundesbank, helped strike the balance 
in favour of the internal aspects of monetary stability. The third concept of 
monetary stability is that measured in terms of the opportunity, or the 
intertemporal, value of money, i.e. the rate of interest. Under this interpretation, 
monetary stability implies stability of the conditions at which central bank 
money is provided to the economy and in particular exchanges with outside 
money. This concept was clearly in the minds of the drafters of the Federal 
Reserve Act, which specifies that the task of the Federal Reserve is to “furnish 
an elastic currency”; it was further specified in the 1946 Employment Act, 
which indicates that the Federal Reserve should set its monetary targets “so as 
to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and 
moderate interest rates”. Under this definition, monetary and price stability do 
not necessarily coincide, as maintaining a stable rate of interest may lead to the 
accommodation of inflationary pressures in the economy and therefore to 
accelerating price dynamics.
The ECB Statute does not give a specific definition of the concept of price 
stability. It should be noted, however, that the objective of the ECB is not just 
to “pursue” but to “maintain” price stability, which implicitly and ambitiously 
excludes any departure from it. On the other hand, Article 2 of the Statute 
clearly mentions that the ECB “shall contribute to the general economic policies 
of the Community”, therefore avoiding a mechanistic interpretation of its role. 
Therefore, unlike some central banks whose statutes have been recently modified 
- such as the Central Bank of New Zealand, where the inflation path is defined 
and decided jointly with the Government - the ECB, like the Bundesbank, may 
decide on the specific inflation path it seeks to attain. The ECB is therefore not 
only allowed independence with respect to its instruments, as will be described 
below, but also with respect to its short-term goals within the framework in 
which price stability is the overriding objective.
In summary, the status given to the ECB provides it with instruments of 
defence to face possible conflicts with other European and national institutions. 
Several commentators have in fact called attention to the fact that no other 
Community institutions could challenge the ECB. According to this line of 
thinking, the Treaty, in its present form, does not provide the necessary balance 
of power. Indeed, the procedures or the institutions responsible for defining and 
implementing “the general economic policies of the Community” mentioned in 




























































































into this debate, an issue of relevance concerns the accountability of the organs 
of the ECB. The Treaty provides several ways and means by which the ECB 
should be accountable. Some would have preferred a contractual-based system 
similar to the one adopted in New Zealand.13 However, as suggested above, the 
latter system is not necessarily preferable in terms of incentive compatibility. 
The system of accountability chosen for the ECB is more similar to that of the 
Bundesbank, with regular reporting addressed to the public, although 
parliamentary hearings similar to those foreseen in the United States for the 
Federal Reserve are also prescribed. However, it cannot be denied that such 
system of accountability based on “public opinion” presupposes the existence of 
a European constituency that monitors and expresses judgements on the ECB’s 
performance and penalises, or rewards, any body trying to pressure the ECB to 
depart from its primary objective. At the European level this situation is far from 
present. It should be the objective of the political union leg of the Treaty, whose 
revision is planned for the next intergovernmental conference, to provide ways 
for such a European-wide constituency to express itself.
3.2. Functional independence
The ECB is provided with a wide range of instruments and procedures 
that enable it to perform its functions with a high degree of independence. 
Several prohibitions further strengthen its independence in the exercise of its 
functions. The prohibition of monetary financing of the government, in particular 
through the granting of any sort of overdraft facilities or the undertaking of 
transactions in government securities in the primary market, represents an 
unprecedented severance of monetary links between the central bank and the 
government. This has implied modifying central bank legislation in all EU 
countries to bring it into line with that of the ECB. The norm is clearly not 
sufficient in itself, but establishes an important principle to which all countries 
were obliged to abide by 1st January 1994.
Another implicit prohibition is incorporated in the indication, mentioned 
in Article 2 of the ECB Statute, that “the ECB shall act in accordance with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition”. This principle, 
which is also mentioned in Article 3a of the Treaty, gives constitutional status 
to the concept of free competition in European countries, something whose 
political implications have not yet been fully analysed. This Treaty article 
protects the ECB from possible pressures to introduce administrative or other




























































































means whose aims have generally been to distort the allocation of financial 
resources in favour of the government.
A final aspect of functional independence concerns the role of the ECB 
in exchange rate policy. Several commentators have indicated that this is a weak 
point in the Treaty, and one which restricts the independence of the ECB.14 
This concern cannot be fully shared.
The text of Article 109 of the Treaty, which specifies the responsibilities 
of the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the ECB in the 
definition of the foreign exchange policy of the Union is rather complex and 
required lengthy negotiations. De facto, the limitations that may be placed on the 
ECB’s monetary policy are very limited if not non-existent.
The constraint exerted on monetary policy depends on the nature of the 
exchange rate regime. The constraint can be very strong in case of a unilateral 
peg of the country’s currency to the currency of another country. This is 
generally the case of a small country, who accepts to bear the burden of 
adjustment and therefore, in practice, accepts to have its monetary policy 
severely constrained. Such a system can hardly be foreseen for the European 
Union. It is unlikely that the EMU will agree to participate in an exchange rate 
regime where the ECU is unilaterally pegged to a foreign currency with the 
Union bearing all the burden of adjustment. While this was the case under the 
Bretton Woods system, where European currencies were unilaterally and 
separately pegged to the US dollar, such a situation cannot be imagined for the 
single currency of the Union, which is expected to be the largest or one of the 
largest economies in the world. This would hardly be rational from an economic 
or political point of view.
If the exchange rate system is of a multilateral nature, where the burden 
of adjustment is not pre-assigned, the latter will tend to fall on the weakest 
currency, i.e. the currency of the country with persistently higher inflation. In 
a system of fluctuation bands, with intervention obligations for all countries, the 
limited availability of reserves means that the country whose currency 
experiences downward pressure sooner or later has to adjust or devalue. Even 
when the possibility of financing interventions by borrowing reserves exists, the 
central bank that borrows to intervene in defence of its currency has to 
reimburse the reserves some day. This implies that there can in practice be no 
unlimited financing, except in a monetary union. A country whose currency is




























































































strong can hardly be permanently affected by the financing of other countries’ 
interventions, since reserves have to be reimbursed over a given time period. 
The country may not even be affected in the short term, if the effect of capital 
inflows on the money base can be fully sterilised. This may depend on the 
amount of assets available to the central bank. In any case, it is hardly difficult 
for a large country to sterilise inflows arising from foreign exchange 
interventions. This has been the experience in the EMS, where the Bundesbank 
has always been able to sterilise the impact of foreign interventions on its 
operational target, even in the presence of substantial flows. This condition is 
even more likely to be fulfilled by the ECB.
Therefore, if the ECU participates in a multilateral exchange rate system 
such as, for instance, the EMS, the Union’s monetary policy can hardly be 
deflected from its price stability objective. On the other hand, the possibility of 
a deflationary bias may not be so easily avoided. If another major currency of 
the system appreciated, defending the parity of the ECU could imply borrowing 
reserves or restricting monetary policy. However, to the extent that this would 
entail an appreciation of the currency which would not be consistent with price 
stability in the sense that it would create deflation, the request for a realignment 
by the central bank would hardly be refused by the political authorities, who 
would also have an interest in avoiding a recession.
In summary, excluding the possibility that the Union decides to 
unilaterally peg its own currency, participation in an exchange rate system may 
not influence in a significant way the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB.
It should be pointed out, finally, that in all countries the choice of the 
exchange rate regime is generally left to the Government. Parliament is most 
often not involved. In the United States, the Treasury has the responsibility for 
international monetary relations and is the owner of the country’s official 
reserves. However, this does not seem to raise substantial institutional issues or 
impinge on the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. In the case of the European 
Union, the process leading to decisions on foreign exchange relations is so 
complex and involves so many institutions that international monetary relations 
are likely to be very cumbersome and impose few constraints on the ECB.
3.3. Economic independence
The economic independence of the ECB relies on a set of elements whose 
importance will emerge fully only over time. To mention just a few: the rules 




























































































responsibility of the Governing Council; the external auditors are to be 
“approved by the Council” on a recommendation by the ECB’s Governing 
Council; the foreign reserve assets of the member countries are owned by the 
ESCB and a part of these is transferred to the ECB; the ECB’s Governing 
Council decides on whether and in what form further foreign reserve assets may 
be called; the accounting rules for implementing the financial accounts of the 
ECB are established by the ECB Governing Council; finally, the provision for 
the allocation of profits and losses is established with wide margins of 
manoeuvre to enable the ECB to preserve its financial independence.
The global impact of these provisions on the ability of the ECB to 
perform its tasks in an independent way is difficult to assess. However, it is 
recognised that the ECB has been provided with a very high degree of financial 
independence compared to most other central banks.15
3.4. Personal independence
The provisions of the Statute grant the members of the ECB governing 
bodies wide personal independence. Without seeking to be exhaustive, the 
following aspects are worth underlining.
A first, important notion, aside from the principle of independence 
mentioned in Article 7 of the Statute, is the principle of “one man one vote”. 
Irrespective of the country of origin, each member of the ECB Governing 
Council has the same vote.16 The Governor of the Institut Monétaire 
Luxembourgeois has the same vote as the President of the Bundesbank, although 
Germany is over 150 times the size of Luxembourg in terms of income and 
population. This principle, which was proposed in the first draft of the ECB 
Statute prepared by the Committee of Governors in mid-1991, creates a strong 
presumption for the members of the governing bodies to take their decisions in 
the interest of the whole Union.
A second aspect is the security of tenure for the members of the Executive 
Board (for eight years), who have to perform their functions on a full-time basis. 
Their salaries are established by the Governing Council. The members of the 
Executive Board are nominated through a complex procedure, requiring 
unanimity of the Heads of State or of Government, on a recommendation from
15 See Goodhart (1992).




























































































the Council. The ECB Governing Council and the European Parliament have to 
be consulted. The members of the Executive Board are explicitly required by the 
Statute to be “persons of recognised standing and professional experience in 
monetary or banking matters”.
A third aspect is that the ECB Governing Council is fully responsible for 
the decisions concerning the ECB’s tasks and functions. A representative from 
the Commission and the President of the Council may participate in the meetings 
of the ECB Governing Council but neither has the right to vote or suspend a 
decision, which is currently possible for instance for the Minister of Finance in 
Germany or in the Netherlands.17
A point that may be considered a weakness of the ECB is the potential 
size of the ECB Governing Council. With the present members of the European 
Union all participating in Monetary Union the Governing Council would be 
composed of twenty-one persons. Experts in management organisation consider 
fifteen to be the maximum number for an efficient decision-making body. This 
number will be reached as nine countries participate in Monetary Union. Beyond 
this number, efficiency may be jeopardised, while dedication to a common goal 
and therefore personal independence may be weakened. In addition, as the 
number of countries increases, the number of central bank Governors will tend 
to outweigh those of the Executive Board. This has been considered as a 
possible danger for the independence of the ECB.18
This aspect is recognised by most as being a politically sensitive problem, 
which may have to be dealt with at a certain stage.
2. The external environment
As indicated in the previous section, the credibility of monetary policy can 
hardly depend on the degree of central bank independence alone. Central banks 
do not operate in a vacuum. Inflation performance, especially in the short term, 
does not depend only on the autonomous conduct of monetary policy but on a 
series of other factors, affecting in particular aggregate demand and cost factors. 
Given the discretionary nature of fiat monetary standards, departure from price 
stability cannot be expected by economic agents to be temporary unless the
17 A decision by the Bundesbank Council can be suspended for two weeks. See Eizenga 
(1987). This possibility has never been resorted to in practice but, according to some 
commentators (Marsch, 1992), it has at times acted as an implicit deterrent.




























































































determination to restore price stability by the central bank is clearly perceived 
as outweighing the effects that this policy will entail in terms of short-term 
output and employment loss. Such expectation does not depend only on central 
bank independence but also on the size of the disturbance and, more generally, 
on the acceptance by society as a whole of price stability as a priority objective 
which has to be pursued even at a short-term cost. This section examines some 
of the factors that may influence the conduct of a stability-oriented monetary 
policy at the start of Stage Three.
1. The economic conditions
At the beginning of Stage Three, the ECB will be confronted with an 
economic environment in the participating countries that will in part be the result 
of actions previously taken by the respective national authorities. Although 
market participants may expect the ECB to behave as the most independent of 
all central banks and to quickly establish its credibility and reputation, the past 
behaviour of national authorities, in particular the NCBs that have become part 
of the ESCB, may influence their judgement. Financial markets have long 
memories and may continue weighing past performance for a long time in 
assessing future prospects. This is the reason why convergence was considered 
to be a prerequisite for selecting the countries that are fit to enter the Union 
without creating disruptive effects and to provide the ECB with the best possible 
environment. This is not to say that starting in a convergent environment is 
sufficient to establish credibility. As indicated in the previous section, credibility 
is lastingly established only after conflicts, and depending on how they are 
resolved. Entering the Union in a favourable environment would improve the 
prospects for establishing the ECB’s credibility but not relax the pressure on the 
ECB to stand ready for possible conflicts.
Assessing the degree of convergence necessary to establish which 
countries are fit to enter EMU will not be an easy task. It has been difficult 
enough to define the concept of convergence and the procedure to assess it in 
a treaty format. Establishing clearly defined and measurable variables to be 
inserted in a legally binding document has been a very difficult task and one 
which remains partly unfinished. Although a mechanical rule would not be 
appropriate to assess convergence, full discretion would also be detrimental, as 
it would provide no economic basis on which to make the political judgement. 




























































































economically sensible decision about which countries are fit to participate in 
EMU.19
Convergence of inflation is a crucial prerequisite for a smooth transition 
to Monetary Union. If countries start with significant differences, the initial 
inflation rate of the Union will be higher than desirable, which would have two 
negative effects. First, it would require a more restrictive monetary policy and 
higher interest rates, at least compared to those previously prevailing in the best­
performing countries, in order to reduce inflation. This would have a 
differentiated impact on the various regions of the union, with the more negative 
effects falling on the countries entering the Union with relatively lower 
inflation.20 Second, it would burden the ECB with the negative heritage of the 
worst performers and negatively affect its credibility.
Inflation convergence is not sufficient for establishing the ECB’s 
credibility at the start of Stage Three. Indeed, according to the procedure 
established in the Treaty, convergence of inflation is measured not in absolute 
terms but in relative terms. It cannot be excluded that a large number of 
countries are within the 1.5 percentage points difference required, while the 
reference inflation rate based on the three best performers is not consistent with 
price stability. This would imply that the Union could start with a relatively high 
average rate of inflation, thereby making it rather difficult for some time for the 
ECB to achieve its primary objective of maintaining price stability.21 Its 
credibility would be jeopardised from the start. Fortunately, the available 
forecasts on inflation performance in EU countries seem to exclude this 
possibility as inflation is expected to remain subdued in the next few years in 
several countries.
The level of the budget deficit also has an impact on the starting economic 
conditions in the Union. An excessive deficit may create pressure on the 
economy which jeopardises the maintenance of price stability not only at the 
very start of Stage Three but also later on. This criterion has the advantage of 
being defined in absolute terms, although a 3% deficit has a different economic 
impact, in particular on price stability, depending on the situation of the cycle. 
A 3% deficit may have negligible short-term effects on price stability, and may
19 See Bini Smaghi, Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia (1995).
20 See Bini Smaghi and Del Giovane (1992).
21 It could be held that the 3 per cent limit on budget deficits and the limit on the debt- 




























































































to a certain extent be acceptable in a recession, while it may be disruptive at the 
peak of the cycle. Measures of cyclically adjusted deficits are controversial and 
could not represent a reliable indicator to be inserted in the Treaty. However, 
there would be risks for a credible start of the ECB if the latter was to be 
confronted with a Monetary Union beginning its life in a relatively favourable 
cyclical situation but with budgetary deficits of around 3% of GDP. Financial 
markets would immediately anticipate the widening of such deficits as soon as 
the economy started to slow, thereby undermining the medium-term 
sustainability of countries’ fiscal positions.
The long-term interest rate and the level and growth of the public debt are 
criteria to assess the longer-term credibility of the move to EMU and therefore 
the credibility of the policy to be implemented by the ECB. To some extent, 
both criteria measure the same condition, although from a different point of view 
and with a different degree of strictness. The long-term interest rate, which takes 
into account the market’s assessment of credibility and longer-term sustainability 
of a country’s policy, allows for a wide margin, 200 basis points with respect 
to the best performers in terms of inflation (which may not be the best 
performer in terms of interest rate), which represents a very large premium in 
capital markets. Examining issues denominated in the same currency, such 
differentials are hardly ever reached, even for very low-quality issuers. Clearly, 
up to the start of Stage Three, the exchange rate premium will play a role, but 
as the starting-date gets closer, the longer-term forward premium tends to 
diminish, with possibly peculiar effects on yield curves. Furthermore, if the 
commitment to participate in the third stage of EMU is perceived as being 
strong for one country, expectations may become self-fulfilling and render this 
criterion practically useless.
The debt criterion is the more difficult one to apply since it involves a 
discretionary judgement on the speed of reduction and the approaching of the 
reference level of 60% of GDP, when government debt exceeds this level. The 
definition of an excessive deficit in terms of debt ratio and dynamics has been 
one of the most complex tasks of the intergovernmental conference. The result 
has been among the most criticised in the literature.22 However, the lack of 
available theoretical and empirical analysis was a major difficulty. The way in 
which this criterion will be implemented will have an impact on the credibility 
of the ECB. The stock of public debt of the Member States of the Union should 
not constrain the room for manoeuvre of the ECB in the conduct of monetary 
policy. This requirement will have to be ensured also in the course of Stage




























































































Three of EMU, not only at the start. Sanctions are being considered for those 
countries which incur excessive deficits. However, several commentators have 
indicated that while the sanctions are very strong before Stage Three, entailing 
non-participation in EMU, they may not be as strong once a country enters the 
Union. To the extent that past budget laxity is an indicator of future laxity, this 
means that either the sanctions foreseen in Stage Three need to be strengthened 
or that the debt criterion should be applied in a more restrictive way before the 
start of Stage Three than thereafter.
To be credible, the ECB should be expected to stand ready to counteract 
the effects of expansionary fiscal policy on price stability. On the other hand, 
countries which are more disciplined would tend to suffer from the increase in 
interest rates produced by the ECB to counter fiscal expansion in the whole area 
or in some countries. This would induce the former group to put pressure on less 
disciplined countries to reduce or avoid excessive deficits. Indeed, in a Monetary 
Union the impact of an expansionary fiscal policy in one country is transmitted 
negatively to the other countries via the higher level of interest rates. In this 
sense, Monetary Union creates an obvious need for closer ties between countries 
to co-ordinate or discipline other areas of economic policy.
In sum, the convergence criteria to be met for the passage to Stage Three 
of EMU should be considered as a set of conditions that enable EMU to be 
viable and the countries that participate in it to reap all its benefits. These 
benefits largely depend on the ECB being credible from the start. A use of the 
criteria that would undermine this credibility would lead to a Union that would 
not fully benefit its participants.
2. The financial markets
According to the Treaty, right after the decision is made on which 
countries can participate in the single-currency area, the ECB will be created and 
the members of the ECB Executive Board will be nominated, in particular the 
President and Vice-President. Stage Three starts after an interim period expected 
to last around one year. During the interim period the ECB has to finalise the 
preparatory work in order to be able to conduct a single monetary policy from 
the start of Stage Three. On the other hand, it is foreseen that national 
authorities will continue to maintain, until the start of Stage Three, the ultimate 




























































































These provisions are the result of two contrasting objectives pursued in 
the Treaty.23 On the one hand, the final decisions concerning the framework 
for the single monetary policy can be taken only by the ESCB, whose governing 
bodies are composed of members of the NCBs of the countries that have been 
selected to participate in the single-currency area. As a consequence, the creation 
of the ECB cannot take place too much in advance of the start of Stage Three, 
i.e. before these countries have been selected. Furthermore, as the ECB will not 
have direct monetary policy responsibilities until the start of Stage Three, there 
is a risk of it being considered an “empty shell” and confusion might arise about 
which institutions is effectively responsible for monetary policy if the ECB is 
in existence much before the start of Stage Three. On the other hand, given the 
time necessary to complete the preparatory work and to implement the ECB’s 
decisions, the ECB cannot be created just before the start of Stage Three. The 
compromise solution is that the ECB is created one year before the start of Stage 
Three.
The credibility of the ECB at the start of Stage Three will depend on what 
happens during the first year of life of the ECB, which takes place before the 
start of Stage Three. During this year, the ECB has to complete the preparation 
of the monetary policy framework for Stage Three but does not have 
responsibility over the monetary policies implemented in the member countries. 
The credibility of the ECB at the start of Stage Three will be strongly affected 
by market developments in the interim period. It will therefore be essential that 
the monetary policies of the future member countries are very closely co­
ordinated. The high degree of convergence that will be reached by the selected 
economies, on the basis of the assessment made with the convergence criteria, 
should grant a high degree of harmony of monetary conditions. However, 
exogenous temporary shocks cannot be excluded. In addition, financial markets 
are known to react not only to economic fundamentals. It cannot be ruled out 
that tensions emerge in the markets that may render policy co-ordination more 
difficult. As an example, elections taking place within the interim period may 
give rise to unforeseen speculation in financial markets.24 Without a very strong 
mechanism of monetary policy co-ordination, temporary tensions may fuel 
market speculation and give rise to self-fulfilling developments; in addition, the 
incentives of national monetary authorities to defend prevailing exchange rates 
on the eve of the irrevocable fixing of conversion rates may not be well defined 
or perceived by the markets. This would be to the detriment of the ECB, which
23 See Bini Smaghi, Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia (1994).
24 It should be borne in mind that 1998 will be a year in which there will be legislative 




























































































would have to stand by, powerless, and watch developments that may produce 
longer lasting effects, in particular on its future credibility. The risk of being an 
“empty shell”, even if only for one year, may have long- term repercussions. 
Therefore, the ECB should have a central role in co-ordinating and binding 
national policies during the interim period so as to ensure a smooth transition to 
Stage Three. De facto, although full Monetary Union starts formally at the 
beginning of Stage Three, a major step towards it will taken when the ECB is 
created.
3. The political environment
The credibility of the ECB, the new institution in charge of running 
monetary policy in the Union, will also depend on the political environment 
surrounding the decision to move to EMU. Two aspects may play a particularly 
important role:
- the acceptability of EMU, and
- its irreversible character, as perceived by economic agents.
3.1. Acceptability
The move to the third stage of EMU is a major monetary reform, leading 
to a change in currency which implies, inter alia, a non-decimal redefinition of 
the numeraire. Given the fiduciary nature of modem monetary systems, the 
confidence of economic agents is a crucial element for monetary stability and 
therefore credibility. Monetary reforms have in the past been resorted to mainly 
to try to regain public confidence in money after periods of monetary instability. 
The EMU reform is substantially different. It will take place in an environment 
in which monetary stability is expected, even required, to have a prior long­
standing record. Such an environment of stability may even become an obstacle 
to EMU, as some citizens may have so much confidence in their own currencies 
that they may doubt the need for EMU or be scared that it may lead to a weaker 
currency. In sum, the elements of a successful reform are necessarily different 
in the case of EMU than in other previous monetary reforms. A few of them are 
discussed in the following section.
The first element of concern for public acceptability regards the selection 
of countries which will participate in Monetary Union from the start. Clearly, 
the initial choice has a much stronger impact on agents’ expectations and on the 
credibility of the ECB than the subsequent decisions to admit new entrants. The 
convergence criteria have been discussed above. To ensure acceptability, the 




























































































clearly understood by the general public. In this respect, an oversimplification 
of the criteria may risk misleading public opinion when the selection is made. 
For instance, suggesting, as is sometimes done, that the debt criterion sets a limit 
of 60% for the debt-to-GDP ratio, without mentioning the dynamic aspect of the 
criterion, may then make it very difficult to explain why some countries have 
been selected although their ratio was higher. The Netherlands and Austria are 
possible examples. These countries, which are certainly among the candidates 
to participate in the single-currency area, having experienced long-lasting 
stability of their currencies, are unlikely to record a debt-to-GDP ratio which is 
lower than 60% even if they undertake very restrictive budgetary policies. In 
sum, citizens should not be led to think that a country has been admitted because 
a criterion has been bent for “political” or other reasons, but because the 
criterion was applied correctly.
The procedure of selection will start in 1996. This will provide an 
occasion for the authorities to explain how they intend to proceed in applying 
the criteria. The application of the criteria should be consistent throughout the 
years. It would be difficult to exclude (or include) a country from the group fit 
to start EMU one year but to include (or exclude) it the following year, as this 
would not easily be understood by citizens unless some really substantial 
changes in performance had occurred. For instance, excluding country A one 
year, because its debt ratio was considered too high and not sufficiently 
decreasing, while accepting the same country the next year, maybe with a 
similar if not worse performance, would hardly be understood by citizens and 
may be interpreted as a watering-down of the criteria. Therefore, being more 
restrictive in the first assessment than in subsequent ones may, to some extent, 
also create problems of credibility; doing the opposite may be difficult for 
political reasons. In sum, the procedure followed the first time to assess 
convergence should be applied consistently also in subsequent exercises and 
clearly explained to citizens and market participants.
A further aspect to be mentioned in this context, which is related to the 
discussion on independence, concerns the possibility of conflicts between the 
monetary and other government authorities. It was suggested in Section 1 that 
the independence of the central bank is often established following the way 
conflicts with the government are resolved. According to this line of reasoning, 
if there were a conflict between the monetary authorities, including the EMI, 
which is the forerunner of the ECB and is required to produce regular reports 
on convergence, and the political authorities on the selection of countries 




























































































at the start of Stage Three, especially if it were not resolved in favour of the 
latter.
The final element in the acceptability of the move to EMU regards the 
advantages entailed in the monetary reform. The discussion of the issue of the 
advantages and disadvantages of EMU has remained at a very academic level 
and has not yet reached the citizens. Just as the authorities preach the credo of 
monetary stability to ensure support for their policies and explain the advantages, 
a similar attitude will have to be taken with regard to the new currency. If the 
citizens perceive that the reform is not fully backed by the authorities, they may 
feel that this has been imposed on them. This interpretation would lead to a loss 
of credibility of the reform and of the institution in charge of managing it. 
Historical examples underline this risk.
3.2. Irreversibility
The credibility of the ECB depends on the irreversible character of the 
monetary reform. If the political process leading to the start of Stage Three does 
not signal a lasting reform, the risks of a fallback may become evident to 
financial markets and economic agents.
Irreversibility depends largely on the cost of breaching the contract. This 
cost must appear to be much greater than the possible advantages, even in 
extreme situations, so as to convince market participants that the process is 
indeed irreversible. Otherwise, the possibility of an escape clause would be 
incorporated in agents’ expectations and give rise to risk premia. The benefits 
of the reform itself would not be fully reaped. Therefore, it is important that 
clear signals are given by the authorities that the process is irreversible and 
lasting. This entails action in the field of legislation, market practices and public 
sector procedures. These refer not only to the purely monetary aspects of the 
Union but also in related fields. As an example, the discipline on public sectors 
cannot be relaxed but on the contrary must be strengthened after the start of 
Stage Three. Applying pressure to further improve discipline, perhaps through 
a stronger and more constraining procedure than the one currently foreseen, can 
be a way to ensure a long-lasting impact on market expectations.
To ensure the irreversibility of the process authorities need to take the lead 
in introducing the single currency and in promoting a smooth transition by all 
economic agents. Authorities are requested to provide a framework for the 
changeover to the single currency that enables private agents to adequately plan 




























































































main tasks of the EMI and other EU and national authorities in the transition 
leading to the single currency.
3. The operational framework of the ESCB
On the first day of Stage Three the ESCB will conduct the single 
monetary policy on the basis of instruments and procedures decided by the ECB 
Governing Council. This framework will comprise, in particular, the definition 
of a strategy in terms of an operational target and an intermediate or final policy 
target, and a set of policy instruments and procedures through which the central 
bank operates with its counterparties.25 Over time, the credibility of the ECB 
will be established through the way policy is implemented. At the start of Stage 
Three, credibility will depend on the assessment that the markets make of the 
framework chosen by the ECB to conduct its monetary policy and on whether 
it is considered appropriate for the achievement of the ECB’s objective of price 
stability.
It will be the task of the ECB to define the framework in a way that 
maximises the credibility of the policy that will be implemented through it. The 
market’s assessment of the framework can be expected to be made according to 
a few general principles: i) efficiency, ii) market orientation, iii) simplicity and 
transparency, iv) continuity.26
1. Efficiency
The credibility of the ECB will partly depend on the market’s assessment 
of whether the monetary policy framework chosen by the ECB is efficient to 
enable it to achieve its targets. This framework entails both strategic and 
operational aspects.
Concerning the strategic aspects of monetary policy, the choice of an 
intermediate or final target will be a crucial decision, to be made by the ECB. 
It will also be evaluated by market participants on the basis of the expected 
stability of financial and economic relations that justify one strategy or another. 
Two types of issues are likely to emerge: first, whether to have an intermediate 
target, and, if so, whether just one or several targets; second, which targets. It 
is not the scope of this section to examine the pros and cons of the various
25 See Monticelli and Vinals (1994) for a discussion of the main options available to the 
ECB.




























































































possibilities. However, the search for credibility requires that markets’ reaction 
are taken into consideration. The literature suggests that the announcement of 
intermediate targets has been perceived in a favourable way by markets, it being 
interpreted as a signal of the commitment to pursue the objective of price 
stability.27 This clearly holds under the condition that the target chosen by the 
authorities had proved to be or was perceived as being instrumental and efficient 
in achieving the final objective.
The choice of a monetary targeting strategy will be assessed on the basis 
of the available evidence concerning the stability of money demand in EMU. If 
unconvincing evidence is presented, a strategy of monetary targeting may lead 
agents to doubt the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy to be followed by 
the ECB, thereby undermining credibility. Research on the stability of the 
demand for an EU-wide monetary aggregate undertaken in recent years can be 
expected to be pursued and to include discussion of the possible implications of 
the move to Monetary Union.28 In particular, it will be essential to understand 
to what extent the move to Stage Three will entail extensive currency 
substitution and financial changes that could, at least temporarily, affect the 
velocity of money circulation. If the start of Stage Three is accompanied by 
major portfolio shifts or currency substitution, due for instance to a lack of full 
credibility of the move to EMU, the velocity of currency circulation would be 
affected, rendering a strategy based on monetary targeting ineffective. The 
perception of such ineffectiveness by market participants is likely to undermine 
the credibility of the ECB.
Concerning the operational framework, in particular the set of instruments 
and procedures, the assessment of their effectiveness is essential to ensure 
credibility from the start. This depends not only on theoretical considerations but 
on the practical evidence that will emerge from the first day of use. From the 
first market operation conducted by the ESCB, the operational framework has 
to be seen as perfectly functioning. This implies, for instance, that if a rather 
decentralised implementation framework is chosen, the execution has to be fully 
consistent with a centralised decision-making process. For the first repurchase 
agreement operation, for example, the various steps to be normally followed by 
a central bank - from the calculation of the liquidity need of the banking system 
in the Union, to the definition and publication of the tender conditions, in terms 
of price or volume, to the collection of the bids, the calculation of allotments,
27 See Bemanke and Mishkin (1992).




























































































and the crediting of the accounts held by the bidders with the NCBs - have all 
to be executed smoothly, as if they were a routine operation in a central bank. 
Any misfunctioning would lead market participants to think that the ECB’s 
framework is not fully appropriate. This would obviously have negative 
repercussions on the credibility of the ECB.
If, instead, a rather centralised approach is adopted for the execution of 
monetary policy, it is essential that the transmission mechanism to the policy­
relevant targets, in particular money market rates, is fully operational. This 
requires in particular that monetary impulses sent by the ECB are transmitted to 
all major financial markets in the Union and implies that interest rates at the 
same maturity are affected uniformly across the Union. No differential should 
emerge that could give the impression that no single monetary policy is 
prevailing. This requires a payment system which enables funds to be transferred 
in real time between market participants located in different areas of the Union 
in order to exploit arbitrage opportunities. If, due to imperfections in the 
payment system or high transaction costs, arbitrage is not be able to operate and 
price differences, even small ones, remain across markets, monetary policy 
would not appear as having a single stance. Confusion would be engendered in 
market participants and the ECB would be held liable for the imperfect 
functioning of markets. An efficient functioning of the payment system is 
therefore a prerequisite for a credible single monetary policy.
2. Market orientation
An element which is likely to affect the credibility of the ECB’s monetary 
policy framework is the extent to which it relies on market mechanisms. This 
principle is already enshrined in the Treaty and in the ESCB Statute. It needs to 
be visibly implemented. This means in particular that markets are put in a 
position to operate smoothly, as suggested above.
Furthermore, the principle of open and competitive markets has to be 
followed also in the practical implementation of the single monetary policy, 
either at a centralised or at a decentralised level. This has a multiplicity of 
implications for the monetary policy framework. For example, the choice of 
counterparties or the access by banks to central bank liquidity, be it at the ECB 
or the NCBs, should not give rise to discrimination, in particular based on 
nationality. Otherwise, the impression could emerge that objectives other than 
EMU-wide ones are being pursued in the conduct of monetary policy, which 
would jeopardise the credibility of the ECB as an institution aiming at price 




























































































The application of the principle of market orientation could be expected 
to give prominence to market instruments, in particular open market or 
repurchase agreements, by which liquidity is injected into the market through 
tender operations. Instruments entailing non-market features and a certain 
amount of discretion, involving in particular bilateral relations between the 
counterparties and the central bank, might have to be given less importance.
3. Simplicity and transparency
Credibility of the monetary policy framework is enhanced if the latter is 
clearly understood by market participants. This implies that it has to be 
relatively simple and explained by the ECB to the public.
Concerning the monetary policy strategy, its effectiveness requires that it 
be publicly announced, possibly in advance of the start of Stage Three. Part of 
the underlying technical analysis will have to be made public and debated. The 
ECB cannot rely on a track record to convince agents that whatever it does will 
be the right thing; agents will have to be convinced, some of them with rather 
technical arguments. The ECB will have to undertake in-depth research in the 
interim period on the stability of certain macroeconomic relations and compare 
its results with outside analysis. It is too early at this stage to forecast the 
content of such a strategy. However, to be easily understood by all market 
participants, it should be relatively simple. Complexity may be interpreted as a 
way to hide different objectives. In this respect a strategy of monetary targeting 
has, ceteris p a r ib u s , the advantage of being relatively simple and can be easily 
monitored by agents.
Concerning the operational aspects of monetary policy, the choice of 
instruments and procedures will have to be disclosed to market participants well 
in advance of Stage Three. A testing period will have to be allowed for, to 
ensure that the framework is fully operational from the start. The simpler the 
structure the more likely agents will adapt to it. Indeed, given the present 
diversity of monetary policy instruments and procedures in the member 
countries, the different structures of markets and degrees of sophistication of 
participants, adjustment will be facilitated if the new instruments are simple. To 
preserve equal access, while having to consider some changes in all countries, 






























































































Market participants do not generally like major changes in market 
practices, unless these are generated by them and are consistent with improved 
business opportunities. Continuity may therefore represent a useful principle to 
follow in order to make market participants more easily accept the ECB’s 
framework. However, to the extent that up to the start of Stage Three differences 
still remain between the monetary structures of the member countries - due for 
instance to the fact that small countries will have an exchange rate target while 
larger ones, certainly the anchor country, has a monetary target - this principle 
cannot be fully implemented. On the other hand, the situation at the start of 
Stage Three will have to be assessed against the prevailing situation in the 
existing member countries and continuity may only apply for those cases that 
more closely resemble that of the future Union. It should therefore be no 
surprise that some continuity is maintained between the structure prevailing in 
some countries and that of the ESCB. Market participants would certainly expect 
so. On the other hand, this principle should be weighed against the fact that the 
start of Stage Three will imply changes in monetary and financial relations. 
Applying too strictly the principle of continuity may lead market participants to 
think that the authorities are underestimating the changes and are content with 
continuing to operate as if nothing had happened. Such excess could also 
undermine credibility.
Conclusions
A successful transition to EMU requires that the credibility of the ECB to 
conduct a stability-oriented monetary policy is firmly established in the eyes of 
market participants. This is not an easy task since the ECB will have no track 
record at the start of its life on which to establish its reputation.
The credibility of the ECB at the start of Stage Three will depend 
on a series of factors that this paper tried to examine. An important one is 
already enshrined in the Treaty, establishing an unprecedented degree of 
independence for the ECB from other national or EU authorities. Other factors 
will also be required, but have not yet been established. First, a high degree of 
stability, in particular in terms of price performance and public finances, in the 
participating member countries. This will depend on the adjustment policies 
adopted in the course of Stage Two of EMU and on the fulfilment of the 
convergence criteria by the participating countries. Second, the ECB’s credibility 
will depend on the political support that it will have in pursuing its primary 




























































































which the ECB is accountable has to be organised within the process of 
deepening the political integration of the European Union. Finally, the credibility 
of the ECB at the start of EMU will depend on the way the transition to the 
single currency is organised. A smooth transition, that strengthens the credibility 
and irreversibility of the EMU process will contribute to reassure market 
participants of the stability-oriented nature of the new union. It will be the task 
of the competent EU and national authorities in the coming years to take the 
appropriate measures in the above areas, with a view to ensure that all 
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Variables for Legal Central Bank Independence
V ariab le
n u m b er
Description of variable W eigh t N um erica l
co d in g
1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.20
a. Term of office
Over 8 years 1.00
6 to 8 years 0.75
5 years 0.50
4 years 0.25
Under 4 years or at the discretion of appointer 0.00
b. Who appoints CEO?
Board of central bank 1.00
A council of the central bank board, executive
board, and legislative branch 0.75
Legislature 0.50
Executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers) 0.25
One or two members of the executive branch 0.00
c. Dismissal
No provision for dismissal 1.00
Only for reasons not related to policy 0.83
At the discretion of central bank board 0.67
At legislature’s discretion 0.50
Unconditional dismissal possible by legislature 0.33
At executive’s discretion 0.17
Unconditional dismissal possible by executive 0.00
d. May CEO hold other offices in government?
No 1.00
Only with permission of the executive branch 0.50





























































































a. Who formulates monetary policy?
Bank alone
Bank participates, but has little influence 
Bank only advises government 
Bank has no say
b. Who has final word in resolution of conflict? (a)
The bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as 
its objectives
Government, on policy issues not clearly defined 
as the bank’s goals or in case of conflict within the 
bank
A council of the central bank, executive branch, and 
legislative branch 
The legislature, on policy issues 
The executive branch on policy issues, subject to due 
process and possible protest by the bank 
The executive branch has unconditional priority
c. Role in the government’s budgetary process 
Central bank active
Central bank has no influence













3 Objectives Ô. 15
Price stability is the major or only objective in the charter,
and the central bank has the final word in case of conflict
with other government objectives 1.00
Price stability is the only objective 0.80
Price stability is one goal, with other compatible objectives,
such as a stable banking system 0.60
Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting
objectives, such as full employment 0.40
No objectives stated in the bank charter 0.20
Stated objectives do not include price stability 0.00
(a) Often the law does not contain a separate provision on the resolution of conflict. In those 
cases, the variable was coded on the basis of the impression from reading the law in its 
entirety. If the law gives the impression that the government formulates policy guidelines that 




























































































V a ria b le
n u m b er
Description of variable W e ig h t N u m e r ic a l
c o d in g
4 L i m i ta t io n s  o n  l e n d in g  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t
a . A d v a n c e s  ( l i m i t a t i o n  o n  n o n s e c u r i t i z e d  le n d in g ) 0 .1 5
N o  a d v a n c e s  p e r m i t t e d 1 .00
A d v a n c e s  p e r m i t t e d ,  b u t  w i th  s t r i c t  l im it s
( e .g . ,  u p  t o  15 p e r c e n t  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  r e v e n u e ) 0 .6 7
A d v a n c e s  p e r m i t t e d ,  a n d  th e  l im it s  a r e  lo o se
( e .g . ,  o v e r  15 p e r c e n t  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  r e v e n u e ) 0 .3 3
N o  le g a l  l im i t s  o n  le n d in g 0 .0 0
b . S e c u r i t i z e d  le n d in g 0 .1 0
N o t  p e r m i t t e d 1 .0 0
P e r m i t t e d ,  b u t  w i th  s t r i c t  l im it s  ( e .g . ,  u p  t o  15
p e r c e n t  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  r e v e n u e ) 0 .6 7
P e r m i t t e d ,  a n d  th e  l im it s  a r e  l o o s e  ( e .g . ,  o v e r  15
p e r c e n t  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  r e v e n u e ) 0 .3 3
N o  le g a l  l im i t s  o n  le n d in g 0 .0 0
c . T e r m s  o f  l e n d i n g  ( m a t u r i ty ,  i n te r e s t ,  a m o u n t ) 0 .1 0
C o n t r o l l e d  b y  th e  b a n k 1.00
S p e c i f i e d  b y  t h e  b a n k  c h a r t e r 0 .6 7
A g r e e d  b e tw e e n  th e  c e n tr a l  b a n k  a n d  e x e c u t iv e 0 .3 3
D e c i d e d  b y  t h e  e x e c u t iv e  b r a n c h  a lo n e 0 .0 0
d . P o te n t i a l  b o r r o w e r s  f ro m  th e  b a n k 0 .0 5
O n ly  th e  c e n t r a l  g o v e r n m e n t 1 .00
A l l  l e v e l s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  ( s t a te  a s  w e l l  a s  c e n t r a l ) 0 .6 7
T h o s e  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e  a n d  p u b l ic  e n te r p r i s e s 0 .3 3
P u b l ic  a n d  p r iv a t e  s e c to r 0 .0 0
e .  L i m i t s  o n  c e n t r a l  b a n k  l e n d in g  d e f in e d  in 0 .0 2 5
C u r r e n c y  a m o u n t s 1 .0 0
S h a r e s  o f  c e n t r a l  b a n k  d e m a n d  l ia b i l i t i e s  o r  c a p i ta l 0 .6 7
S h a r e s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  r e v e n u e 0 .3 3
S h a r e s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i tu r e s 0 .0 0
f. M a tu r i t y  o f  l o a n s 0 .0 2 5
W ith in  6  m o n th s 1 .0 0
W ith in  1 y e a r 0 .6 7
M o r e  t h a n  1 y e a r 0 .3 3
N o  m e n t io n  o f  m a tu r i t y  in  t h e  la w 0 .0 0
g . I n te r e s t  r a t e s  o n  lo a n s  m u s t  b e 0 .0 2 5
A b o v e  m in im u m  r a te s 1 .0 0
A t  m a r k e t  r a te s 0 .7 5
B e lo w  m a x im u m  r a t e s 0 .5 0
I n te r e s t  r a t e  is  n o t  m e n t io n e d 0 .2 5
N o  in te r e s t  o n  g o v e r n m e n t  b o r r o w in g  f ro m  th e  c e n tr a l  b a n k 0 .0 0
h . C e n t r a l  b a n k  p r o h ib i te d  f ro m  b u y in g  o r  s e l l in g  g o v e r n m e n t  s e c u r i t i e s
in  t h e  p r im a r y  m a r k e t? 0 .0 2 5
Y e s 1 .0 0
N o 0 .0 0
ote: The ranking under each criteria indicates the degree ol independence of central banks -
the higher the code, the more independent the central bank.
Source: Various central bank laws, Aufricht (1961, 1967); Bank for International Settlements 































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 
Telefax No: +39/55/4685 636 
E-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it
From N am e.................................................................
Address..............................................................
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1996/97





































































































W ork in g  P apers o f  the R obert S chum an C entre
RSC No. 94/1 
Fritz W. SCHARPF 
Community and Autonomy Multilevel 
Policy-Making in the European Union *
RSC No. 94/2
Paul McALEAVEY
The Political Logic of the European
Community Structural Funds Budget:




Japanese Public Policy for Cooperative 
Supply of Credit Guarantee to Small Firms - 




European Integration Between Political 
Science and International Relations Theory: 
The End of Sovereignty *
RSC No. 94/5
Stefaan DE RYNCK
The Europeanization of Regional
Development Policies in the Flemish Region
RSC No. 94/6 
Enrique ALBEROLAILA 
Convergence Bands: A Proposal to Reform 




The EC and the New United Nations
RSC No. 94/8 
Sidney TARROW
Social Movements in Europe: Movement 
Society or Europeanization of Conflict?
RSC No. 94/9
Vojin DIMTTRUEVIC
The 1974 Constitution as a Factor in the








Privatization in Disintegrating East European 
States: The Case of Former Yugoslavia
RSC No. 94/12 
Alberto CHILOSI
Property and Management Privatization in 
Eastern European Transition: Economic 




Integration Theory, Subsidiarity and the 
Internationalisation of Issues: The 
Implications for Legitimacy *
RSC No. 94/14
Simon JOHNSON/Heidi KROLL 
Complementarities, Managers and Mass 
Privatization Programs after Communism
RSC No. 94/15
Renzo DAVEDDI
Privatization in the Transition to a Market 
Economy
RSC No. 94/16 
Alberto BACCINI
Industrial Organization and the Financing of 
Small Firms: The Case of MagneTek
RSC No. 94/17 
Jonathan GOLUB




Multilateralism Matters but How?
The Impact of Multilateralism on Great 































































































A ‘Federator’ for Europe: Altiero Spinelli 




Blueprints of Nordic Integration. Dynamics 




Mutual Trust, Credible Commitments and 
the Evolution of Rules for a Single 
European Market
RSC No. 95/2 
Ute COLLIER
Electricity Privatisation and Environmental 
Policy in the UK: Some Lessons for the 
Rest of Europe
RSC No. 95/3 
Giuliana GEMELLI 
American Influence on European 
Management Education: The Role of the 
Ford Foundation
RSC No. 95/4 
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
Institutional Reform in the European 




The New World Order, Incorporated:
The Rise of Business and the Decline of the 
Nation-State
RSC No. 95/6 
Liesbet HOOGHE
Subnational Mobilisation in the European 
Union
RSC No. 95/7
Gary MARKS/Liesbet HOOGHE/Kermit 
BLANK
European Integration and the State
RSC No. 95/8
Sonia LUCARELLI
The International Community and the
Yugoslav Crisis: A Chronology of Events *
RSC No. 95/9
A Constitution for the European Union? 
Proceedings o f  a Conference, 12-13 May 
1994, Organized by the Robert Schuman 




‘Subversive Liberalism’: Market Integration, 
Globalisation and the European Welfare 
State
RSC No. 95/11
Joseph H.H. WEILER/ Ulrich HALTERN/ 
Franz MAYER
European Democracy and its Critique - 
Five Uneasy Pieces
RSC No. 95/12
Richard ROSE/Christian HAERPFER 
Democracy and Enlarging the European 
Union Eastward
RSC No. 95/13 
Donatella DELLA PORTA 
Social Movements and the State: Thoughts 
on the Policing of Protest
RSC No. 95/14
Patrick A. MC CARTHY/Ans 
ALEXOPOULOS
Theory Synthesis in IR - Problems & 
Possibilities
RSC No. 95/15 
Denise R. OSBORN 
Crime and the UK Economy
RSC No. 95/16
Jérôme HENRY/Jens WEIDMANN 
The French-German Interest Rate 
Differential since German Unification:





































































































RSC No. 95/19 
Joseph H.H. WEILER 
The Stale “über ailes”
Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht 
Decision
RSC No. 95/20 
Marc E. SMYRL
From Regional Policy Communities to 
European Networks: Inter regional 
Divergence in the Implementation of EC 
Regional Policy in France
RSC No. 95/21 
Claus-Dieter EHLERMANN 
Increased Differentiation or Stronger 
Uniformity *
RSC No. 95/22 
Emile NOËL
La conférence intergouvemementale de 1996 
Vers un nouvel ordre institutionnel
RSC No. 95/23 
Jo SHAW
European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? 
Towards a New Dynamic
RSC No. 95/24 
Hervé BRIBOSIA
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Belgium
RSC No. 95/25 
Juliane KOKOTT
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Germany
RSC No. 95/26 ____
Monica CLAES/Bruno DE WITTE 
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on the Netherlands
RSC No. 95/27 
Karen ALTER
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context
Explaining National Court Acceptance o f 
European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation o f Theories o f Legal Integration
RSC No. 95/28 
Jens PLOTNER
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on France
RSC No. 95/29 
P.P. CRAIG
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on the United Kingdom
RSC No. 95/30
Francesco P. RUGGERI LADERCHI 
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Italy
RSC No. 95/31 
Henri ETIENNE
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Luxembourg
RSC No. 95/32
Philippe A. WEBER-PANARIELLO 
The Integration of Matters of Justice and 
Home Affairs into Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union: A Step Towards more 
Democracy?
RSC No. 95/33 
Debra MATTER
Data, Information, Evidence and Rhetoric in 
the Environmental Policy Process:
The Case of Solid Waste Management
RSC No. 95/34 
Michael J. ARTIS




Exchange Rate Arrangements for a Multi-
Speed Europe
RSC No. 95/36 
IverB. NEUMANN 
Collective Identity Formation: Self and 




























































































RSC No. 95/37 
Sonia LUCARELU
The European Response to the Y ugoslav 
Crisis: Story of a Two-Level Constraint
RSC No. 95/38
Alec STONE SWEET 
Constitutional Dialogues in the European 
Community *
RSC No. 95/39 
Thomas GEHRING 
Integrating Integration Theory: 
Neofunctionalism and International Regimes
RSC No. 95/40 
David COBHAM
The UK’s Search for a Monetary Policy:
In and Out of the ERM
RSC No. 96/1 
Ute COLLIER
Implementing a Climate Change Strategy in 
the European Union: Obstacles and 
Opportunities
RSC No. 96/2 
Jonathan GOLUB 
Sovereignty and Subsidiarity in EU 
Environmental Policy
RSC No. 96/3 
Jonathan GOLUB
State Power and Institutional Influence in 




Intégration ou désintégration? Cinq thèses 
sur l’incidence de l’intégration européenne 
sur les structures étatiques
RSC No. 96/5 
Jens RASMUSSEN 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Risk M anagement Issues - Doing Things 
Safely with Words: Rules and Laws
RSC No. 96/6 
Olivier GODARD 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Social Decision-Making under Conditions o f  




Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Cases o f  Food and Pharmaceuticals
RSC No. 96/8 
Ernesto PREVIDI 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
L'organisation des responsabilités publiques 
et privées dans la régulation européenne des 
risques: un vide institutionnel entre les 
deux?
RSC No. 96/9 
Josef FALKE
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Role o f  Non-governmental 
Standardization Organizations in the 




Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and 
the European Court o f  Justice: Legal 
Frameworks fo r  Denationalized Governance 
Structures
RSC No. 96/11 
Martin SHAPIRO 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Frontiers o f  Science Doctrine: American 
Experiences with the Judicial C ontrol o f  
Science-Based Decision-Making
RSC No. 96/12
Gianna BOERQ/Giuseppe TULLIO 
Currency Substitution and the Stability of 
the German Demand for Money Function 




























































































RSC No. 96/23 
Margaret LEVI 
AState of Trust
RSC No. 96/24 
Lorenzo BINI SMAGHI 
How Can the ECB be Credible?
RSC No. 96/15 
Daniel GROS
A Reconsideration of the Cost of EMU 
The Importance of External Shocks and 
Labour Mobility
RSC No. 96/16
Pierre LASCOUMES/Jérôme VALLUY 
Les activités publiques conventionnelles 
(APC): un nouvel instrument de politique 
publique? L’exemple de la protection de 
l'environnement industriel
RSC No. 96/17 
Sharmila REGE




L’arrêt “Kalanke”, expression du discours
dualiste de l’égalité
RSC No. 96/19
Jean BLONDEL/Richard SINNOTT/Palle 
SVENSSON
Institutions and Attitudes: Towards an 
Understanding of the Problem of Low 
Turnout in the European Parliament 
Elections of 1994
RSC No. 96/20 
Keith BLACKBURN/Lill HANSEN 
Public Policy and Economic Growth in an 




Pitfalls on the Path to a Single European
Currency
RSC No. 96/22
Roel M.WJ. BEETSMA/A. Lans
BOVENBERG
Does Monetary Unification Lead to 
Excessive Debt Accumulation?
RSC No. 96/13
Riccardo MARSELU/Marco VANNINI 
Estimating the Economic Model of Crime in 




The Economics of Convergence Towards 
Monetary Union in Europe
'out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
